

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON

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October 30, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. Craig
25X9A5
From: [REDACTED]
Subject: Communist Party Line

25X1A9a

Supplementing [REDACTED] memorandum on Stalin's speech, the following points may be of some use:

1. Further evidence against the "popular front" hypothesis comes from Stalin's article on economic problems. The stress on inter-capitalist conflicts, including the possibility of wars, is reminiscent not so much of 1936 as of the late twenties. It indicates a relatively hopeful outlook for revolutionary movements.
2. Both Stalin and Malenkov imply that world war, though still a grave "threat," is perhaps less probable than formerly because of the increased relative strength of the Soviet bloc and the further development of forces making for disintegration of the capitalist system. This implies less need for such devices as the "popular front." It also indicates that if general war really is less probable in Soviet eyes, the reasons are grim rather than encouraging for Western hopes: Stalin may feel that he has passed the peak of danger produced by our sudden spurt towards rearmament born of the Korean emergency, and that from now on he can probably retain military superiority and devote relatively greater attention to profiting by the economic and political backlash now beginning to result from our original drive for a rapid build-up. Such profit-taking means efforts at further revolutionary gains at our expense, not a "softening" of the general line.

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3. Stalin's speech, while in the main reviving further the language of orthodox class warfare, nevertheless combines it with the post-war slogans of "peace," "national independence," etc. which, of course, are calculated to have wider appeal. This is matched by Stalin's statement in his article to the effect that the peace movement does not aim directly at socialism though it may develop into a revolutionary struggle in some cases.

4. Malenkov's speech (about the middle of part 2) is most precise about excluding a genuine "popular front" because he attacks the British Labor Party, the French Socialist Party, and the German SPD. But he does speak hopefully of some "more sober and progressive politicians" who are "not blinded by anti-Soviet hostility" and "are beginning to come out against war." This leads him to predict that "peace-loving democratic forces" in countries that are now pawns of "American dictatorship" will find a way of establishing an independent "peaceful" policy, and he promises that countries which enter on this "new path" will meet with "full understanding on the part of all peace-loving countries." This can be read as a lure held out to Bevanites and similar dissidents who might come in time to break with NATO and similar American alliances, but it offers no evidence that Stalin will make any real steps to meet them half-way.

5. The general trend toward an orthodox communist line is confirmed by Togliatti's speech of October 17 (Pravda, October 20) which refers expressly to the Moscow Party Congress. Togliatti gives major prominence to "the working class" and "the international communist movement." Here also, however, Leninist orthodoxy is modified to the extent of combining national and peace motives with those of socialism. No mention is made of any alliance with bourgeois parties, but "the progressive part of the middle stratum" is included along with "toilers" in the concept of the "people," of which "the working class" is "the leading, most organized part."

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6. In sum, the line looks like a moderate shift toward more open expression and pursuit of Leninist revolutionary aims. Instead of "popular front" there is a continuation of "peace front" and national "fronts," which have masked those aims for certain psychological purposes in recent years.

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THE DIRECTOR OF
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
FROM: John Elliott / 25X1A9a
SUBJECT: Comments on the [REDACTED] Paper "Possible Implications of Stalin's Speech."

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As a programmatic speech, it seems to me that Stalin's address of October 15 before the nineteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist party was much less revealing and indicative of future Soviet intentions than his statement of policy on political and economic affairs published in the magazine "Bolshevik" on the eve of the Congress.

Particularly significant, as I see it, are Stalin's remarks about the disintegration of the pre-1939 united world markets, the consequent deepening of the crisis of the world capitalist system, and his thesis of the "inevitability" of future wars between the capitalist countries.

Therefore while I agree with Ed Taylor's interpretation that Stalin's plans no "hot war" for the immediate future and that the Soviet Government is likely to continue to rely heavily on the pattern of indirect aggression by revolution, I am not able to follow his line of reasoning, leading to the conclusion that the master of the Kremlin is not contemplating a revival of popular front tactics on the Continent and that no basic change in Communist tactics in Western Europe is impending.

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In the light of Marshal's article, "Chip" Bohlen strikes me as being absolutely right when he says that Stalin's supreme objective at present is to smash the Grand Alliance (NATO) which has been formed against him and to isolate the United States, its principal architect, by separating this country from its Allies, particularly Great Britain, France, Western Germany, and Italy.

The Soviet dictator apparently hopes to arrive at his goal over these two paths:

1. On the international plane to strive to drive a wedge between the United States and its Allies;
2. On the national level, foregoing the policy of violence and direct action, to use the national Communist parties

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as catalytic agents to form "popular fronts" with a view to fostering neutralism and promoting resentment against increased expenditures for defense as well as to spreading the belief amongst the peoples of Europe that the United States is a war-mongering nation, seeking to incite other countries to wage war against "peace-loving" Soviet Russia.

1. The Kremlin is obviously gravely disquieted by the prospect of West Germany's rearmament and adherence to the Atlantic Pact, the Schuman Plan which promises to eliminate the struggle for markets among capitalist nations, and the developing tendencies towards European political union. To forestall such a development, Moscow aims to drive a wedge into the rapidly-forming Western defence bloc, led by the United States.

Indicative of what appears to be the Soviet policy was the naming last summer of Andrei A. Gromyko, chief Deputy Foreign Minister, to be Ambassador to London. In this way Moscow showed the great importance it attached to its relations with Britain at the present juncture.

Gromyko's appointment was preceded and followed by articles in the Soviet press, pointing out the advantages that would accrue to Britain from a general improvement in Soviet-British relations. Soviet commentators have been stressing repeatedly the divergence of interests between Britain and the United States in the Far East and also with respect to policies on the European Continent, particularly as concerns Germany. What are described as "Anglo-American contradictions" have been receiving increasing attention in Soviet official publications.

In recent months the Soviet press has been whipping up its "hate campaign" against the United States while devoting relatively little attention to the role of Britain in the formation of Western policy. And if one day the Churchill Government were to be replaced by a Labor cabinet dominated by Aneurin Bevan, Gromyko would be right on the spot to exploit the possibilities inherent in this situation.

Ed Taylor's allusion to a resurrection of the Rapallo policy by the Soviets is apt, especially when it is related to the policy lurking behind the Moscow economic conference of last spring. There is every likelihood that the Soviets propose to emphasize the mounting dollar gap of the sterling area countries caused by the United States sponsored restrictions on East-West trade. If unemployment rises, the greater will the temptation for the British to accept Soviet trade offers, particularly if they are accompanied by United States tariff increases on European imports. From the Kremlin's point of view, American commercial policies offer great possibilities of staging a super-Rapallo that would separate Britain from the United States and thereby wreck NATO as the earlier Rapallo of the twenties torpedoed Lloyd George's dream of a European economic union.

Likewise, dissension between the United States and France over the impending German rearmament, the Saar, and North Africa can be expected to be utilized by Soviet diplomacy to the utmost. In this connection it

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is perhaps not without significance that while Stalin made no move to invite George Kennan to the Kremlin during the time the American Ambassador was in Moscow, the Soviet dictator hastened to receive the French Ambassador shortly after his arrival there and is reported to have made an effort to exploit current Franco-American differences, doubtless with the hope of ultimately setting up a tacit Franco-Soviet alliance against the United States.

Stalin's opening move to detach Italy from the West was made this month when Pietro Nenni, left-wing Italian Socialist leader, fresh from his reception by Stalin in Moscow, called on Premier Alcide de Gasperi and presented him with a plan for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between Soviet Russia and Italy.

It is also perhaps worth noting, in passing, that only this week, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, was host at a "secret" dinner in New York City at which the guests were not only members of the Soviet bloc, but also delegates representing the "neutral" countries of Asia and the Middle East to the United Nations General Assembly.

2. Simultaneously with this diplomatic campaign, the Soviets are trying through the agency of the national Communist parties to detach the Western European nations from the Atlantic Pact and to slow down their re-armament.

It is true, as Ed Taylor points out, that at present a popular front movement of the pattern that produced the Leon Blum cabinet in France in 1936 is unthinkable. Today British, French, and German socialists will have no truck with the Communists. Nevertheless, recent developments in Europe appear to point to an abandonment of direct action method on the part of the Communists such as led to the general strikes in France and Italy in favor of cooperation between Communist and bourgeois elements.

Nowhere is this shift in tactics on the part of the Communists more evident than in France. There Jacques Duclos, in announcing on September 3 last, the return of Maurice Thorez, the French Communist leader, to his own country after an absence of two years in Moscow, launched an appeal for a "United National Front" that would include all groups willing to join the Communists in opposing the European Coal and Steel Community, the Atlantic Defense Community, and West German re-armament. His call was followed in a fortnight by the dramatic news that Andre Marty and Charles Tillon, had been publicly disgraced and demoted. Exponents of a policy of violence and revolutionary tactics, these almost legendary French Communist heroes, have been discredited by the fiasco of the anti-Ridgway demonstration. French Communism, disillusioned, was reverting to the "soft" tactics, exemplified by Thorez, co-engineer of the "Popular Front" of the thirties.

Similar tactics are being employed by the Communists in Italy where the party's central committee, meeting to review the party's policy in the light of the municipal elections of the spring, pointed out the need

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for a broad Communist-dominated electoral front made up of "leftist independents", Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals. The party's current propaganda themes emphasize not the nationalization of industry or the supremacy of the proletariat, but anti-Fascism, defense of the republican constitution and anti-clericalism. It is virtually certain that the Communists, as in 1948, will enter the parliamentary elections next spring on a common electoral ticket with the Nenni Socialists.

Like Duclos in France, Max Reimann, the Communist leader in Western Germany, has raised the banner of the popular front. The recent action of the Communist-dominated East German government in sending a parliamentary delegation to Bonn to confer with their West German opposite numbers on the subject of German unification points up the move on the part of the Reds to cooperate with non-Communist Germans, in preventing the integration of West Germany into Western Europe. The German Communists will work closely with Pastor Martin Niemoller and the German "neutralists" in seeking to obtain their objectives.

And while the Kremlin is holding out the olive branch to the Allies of the United States, the "hate campaign" against this country continues unabated. Most significant in this connection is the recent ousting by the Soviet Government of George Kennan as American Ambassador to Moscow. Kennan was a leading exponent of the theory that peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Government is possible and he went hopefully on his mission to Moscow, believing that he could make a substantial contribution to improving the relations between the two countries. But a six month's sojourn in the Soviet capital was enough to thoroughly disillusion Kennan and long before his enforced departure he was sounding the tocsin to his home government about the menace inherent in Soviet propaganda against the United States.

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